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Political Context, Issue Salience, and Selective
Attentiveness: Constituent Knowledge of the
Clarence Thomas Confirmation Vote
Vincent L+ Hutchings
University of Michigan
According to the issue salience hypothesis, citizens tend to acquire information on subjects they
perceive as important. However, past efforts to demonstrate this have been mixed. I argue that this
is because scholars often fail to recognize the importance of overlapping group memberships. I
maintain that different group memberships—a traditional proxy for issue salience—can cancel out
effects if they are in conflict. Some research has also shown that cues in the political environment
increase levels of political information. Extending this line of research, I hypothesize that the in-
teraction of salience with environmental cues influences both information and participation levels.
I find that an examination of the confirmation vote for Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas
largely confirms these hypotheses.
Public opinion research has consistently shown that citizens are not routinely
attentive to matters of public policy (Bennett 1995; Converse 1964; Smith 1989).
This uncomfortable reality presents some obvious difficulties for the normative
ideal of responsive government inherent in democratic theory. Political scien-
tists have developed a number of ways to reconcile the “shortcomings” of the
electorate with the responsibilities required of them in a representative democ-
racy. One of the more popular explanations is issue salience. This theory holds
that while citizens may be generally uninformed, they are often knowledgeable
on issues that they consider important. A common way of testing this theory is
to examine whether members of particular social groups are more informed
about policies directly relevant to their group.
Other explanations for variation in information levels focus on factors exter-
nal to the individual. For example, one argument maintains that citizens are ill
informed about politics because the news media do not provide sufficient cov-
erage of policy matters (Patterson 1994). When the media do focus on these
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issues, citizens show a sizable increase in information levels (Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996). According to another argument, citizens are more likely to be
attentive to politics when cues in their environment suggest that their attentive-
ness is warranted (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).
Whereas each of these factors likely affects levels of political information,
previous research has not always supported these theories. In the case of the
issue salience hypothesis, results have largely been mixed (Delli Carpini and
Keeter 1996; Iyengar 1990; Price and Zaller 1993). I argue that part of the
reason for this is that previous research has neglected the importance of over-
lapping group identities. That is, compatible group identities can combine to
facilitate selective attentiveness just as conflicting identities can work to sup-
press it. When the interaction of different group identities is considered, evi-
dence for the issue salience hypothesis should become stronger.
This article examines the issue salience hypothesis by focusing on a recent
high-profile vote in the U.S. Senate: the vote to confirm Clarence Thomas to
the Supreme Court. The Thomas vote provides an excellent opportunity to test
this hypothesis because the controversy surrounding it raised prominently the
issues of race, gender, and ideology. A naive test of this hypothesis would merely
examine whether blacks, women, and ideologues were more attentive than other
citizens to this vote. I argue that a more nuanced approach is required. For
example, the issues raised during the Hill-Thomas hearings were just as likely
to be salient to some men as they were to some women. As argued more fully
below, liberal women and conservative men should have been particularly in-
terested in the outcome of the vote.
In addition to individual level differences, citizens also encountered impor-
tant differences in their informational and political environments that should
have affected knowledge of this vote. For example, some senators faced reelec-
tion not long after the Thomas vote and encountered challengers who were
likely to campaign on the issue. Additionally, some voters also resided in states
where the local political circumstances encouraged more attentiveness to this
roll call. That is, for some senators the political implications of the vote were
particularly conspicuous.
The link between the informational environment and levels of political knowl-
edge seems plausible, and some previous work has already established a con-
nection. Research on the effects of the political environment, however, has been
rare. Most work on the effects of the political environment focuses on partici-
pation rates or public opinion. Little work has been done showing that cues in
the political environment can also motivate greater levels of attentiveness. I
argue that context effects of this kind, even subtle ones, can affect levels of
attentiveness to political information. Moreover, individual perceptions of issue
salience should interact with cues in the political environment to bolster citizen
information levels. I argue that not only do issue salience and the political (and
informational) context contribute separately to political information levels, but
that their effects can also manifest themselves jointly.
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This perspective on the importance of context and salience may also help to
determine if the Thomas vote had any impact on the 1992 Senate elections. In
other words, a consideration of individual and environmental factors might in-
dicate whether this issue had any influence on the voter’s candidate choice. In
order to answer this question, I argue that we need to know which voters were
most interested in this issue and whether the political context provided an op-
portunity to reward or punish the incumbent.
Finally, this examination of the Thomas vote contributes to the debate on the
acquisition of political information. One set of scholars argues that citizens are
“information specialists” or tend to absorb information primarily on topics that
interest them (see especially Iyengar 1990). Others argue that citizens are in-
stead more likely to be “generalists” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Price and
Zaller 1993). According to this perspective individuals who are generally well
informed about politics also tend to learn about specific political stories regard-
less of their interest in the story. Since the survey data used for this paper carry
adequate measures of both concepts, we can learn which perspective generates
the best explanation on a key Senate roll call vote.
Literature Review and
Theoretical Expectations
While much of the public opinion literature finds low levels of voter knowl-
edge, research on domain-specific attentiveness indicates that this may be over-
stated (Iyengar 1990; Krosnick 1990; McGraw and Pinney 1990). Scholars in
this literature find that the “costs” of becoming well-informed on more than a
few issues are too great for most people. Instead, individuals focus on issues
that are personally relevant to them or salient reference groups (Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Conover 1984; Converse 1964; McGraw and
Pinney 1990; Turner et al. 1987). For example, Iyengar shows that blacks, Jews,
and blue-collar workers are more informed than other citizens about issues
affecting their groups (Iyengar 1990; Price and Zaller 1993).
While some research has found evidence of domain specific attentiveness,
other studies have found more limited support for this theory (Delli Carpini
and Keeter 1996; Nueman 1986; Price and Zaller 1993). These studies find that
even when some citizens care deeply about an issue, they are not always more
informed about the issue. Moreover, they do not consistently rely upon the
issue when evaluating political candidates (Wolpert and Gimpel 1997).
Research in the field of social psychology may help to explain when domain-
specific effects should be present. Self-Categorization Theory explains the cir-
cumstances required to elicit group-specific attentiveness (Turner et al. 1987).
According to this theory, group membership has the biggest influence on per-
ceptions when the group identification is both readily accessible (i.e., identifi-
cation is strong) and the social stimuli “fit” with the relevant group identity. In
other words, the relationship between issue salience and attentiveness is estab-
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lished when a group identity is “primed” by environmental factors (Iyengar and
Kinder 1987; Turner et al. 1987; Verba, Burns, and Scholzman 1997). Thus, the
framing of the Thomas vote in explicitly racial, gender, and ideological terms
should have prompted selective attentiveness among blacks, women, and
ideologues.
Of course, citizens could belong to more than one of these groups. However,
multiple memberships would not necessarily enhance salience effects particu-
larly if those memberships were in conflict. As the early Columbia and Michi-
gan models found, conflicting group identities are associated with less accurate
political perceptions, lower levels of political participation, and less interest in
politics (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell et al. 1960). I there-
fore do not expect to find evidence of selective attentiveness among women
generally, but rather only among ideologically liberal women. This is because
this group’s ideological and gender identities were largely consistent on the
Thomas vote. Conservative women, on the other hand, were more likely torn
between their gender and their ideology. As a result, their divided political sym-
pathies should result in less interest in the outcome of the vote, and hence less
attentiveness. The same applies to liberal men who, as men, may have felt some
sympathy for Thomas but, as liberals, opposed his stand on the issues. Finally,
conservative men should also demonstrate heightened attentiveness on the Thomas
vote as they were inclined to feel little conflict on the issue.1
Additional contextual variables beyond the content of the vote may have also
stimulated attentiveness. As Delli Carpini and Keeter indicate, few examina-
tions of the determinants of political information include context variables (Delli
Carpini and Keeter 1996). By context, they mean both the informational con-
text (i.e., greater media coverage in a particular geographic region) and the
political context (i.e., local political circumstances that encourage greater inter-
est and knowledge). It is possible that both effects were present for the Thomas
confirmation vote.
Previous research has shown that citizens are more informed on political
matters in areas with heavier media coverage (Chaffee and Wilson 1977). Thus,
citizens should be more informed on the Thomas vote in states that provided
greater media attention to the issue. Although the amount of press coverage
probably did not vary much across states at the time of the vote, some citizens
were more likely to be reminded of their senator’s position during the 1992
campaign season. Moreover, some of these senators faced female challengers
who were especially outspoken on this vote (Cook, Thomas, and Wilcox 1994;
Paolino 1995; Sapiro and Conover 1997).
The different political contexts each senator faced may also have contributed
to knowledge of this vote. There is little scholarship on the relationship be-
1Analysis of Senate Election Study survey data shows that a clear majority of liberal women
(59%) opposed the nomination and a clear majority of conservative men (60%) supported it. Less
than half of liberal men and conservative women, however, sided with their ideological counterparts.
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tween political context and political knowledge. An important exception can be
found in the work of Bobo and Gilliam (1990). They find that blacks are more
informed about local politics when an African American occupies the mayor’s
office because this implies greater policy responsiveness to black interests. I
agree that forces in the political environment can encourage increased attentive-
ness to politics. However, the present study focuses upon different elements in
the political environment. I argue that citizens can also be motivated by the
perception that their political interests are threatened (Marcus and Mackuen
1993). Contextual cues conveying this message need not rely on who occupies
a prominent political office. They can instead turn on something as subtle as
the political circumstances surrounding an important vote.
To my knowledge, no previous work has addressed whether small differ-
ences in the political context can affect knowledge of the issue positions of
politicians. Moreover, we do not know if factors in the political environment
and intense interest in an issue can work interactively to increase information
levels. The Thomas vote provides us with an opportunity to examine these un-
explored areas. This is because media coverage of this vote was qualitatively
different in states represented by swing Democrats. As described below, the
media made it clear that the fate of the nomination rested with these senators. I
hypothesize that residents in these states would be especially attentive to their
senator’s vote because the political stakes surrounding it were higher there.
This enhanced attentiveness should be even greater among the issue publics
examined in this article. This is especially true of African Americans. Most of
the swing Democrats represented southern states with large black constituen-
cies and they could ill-afford to alienate these voters (Overby et al. 1992).
Background
Although Thomas is a conservative Republican and was opposed by many
civil rights organizations, blacks were nevertheless more supportive of his
nomination than were whites. This was especially true after Oklahoma law
professor Anita Hill raised charges of sexual harassment (Caldeira and Smith
1996). Also, a surprising number of black elites came out in support of the
nomination. For example, Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder, Rev. Joseph Low-
ery of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Niara Sudarkasa, presi-
dent of Lincoln University, columnist William Raspberry, Harvard sociologist
Orlando Patterson, and poet Maya Angelou all supported Thomas (Burnham
1992; Marable, 1992; Pinderhughes 1992). Many local leaders supported Thomas
as well, even as they rejected his conservative political views (Pinderhughes
1992).
The reaction to the harassment charges was more disjointed among women.
Many liberal women, already suspicious of Thomas because of his evasiveness
on the abortion question, viewed the charges as an additional reason to oppose
the nomination. Moreover, Thomas faced relatively strong opposition from white
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women (Caldeira and Smith 1996; Mansbridge and Tate 1992). Still, overall a
majority of women (white and black) supported Thomas.
Responses to the Thomas nomination were largely positive in the Democrat-
ically controlled Senate before Anita Hill’s allegations were raised. After the
first set of hearings, thirteen Democratic senators, more than enough to ensure
confirmation, announced their support for Thomas. Most of these senators were
from the South. After the charges of sexual harassment were made public, the
votes of these thirteen swing Democrats, six of whom were up for reelection in
1992, were seen as critical to the success or failure of the nomination.2
Once the second round of hearings was completed, many of the swing Dem-
ocrats agonized over their decision and sought advice from family and co-
workers. For example, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) decided to oppose
the nomination only after speaking with his 22-year-old daughter. He described
the vote as the most difficult he has cast in his three years in the Senate. Sen-
ator Richard Bryan (D-NV) said, “In 25 years, this is the toughest vote I’ve
had to cast.” 3 He received more calls from his constituents on this matter than
on the Persian Gulf war, with most favoring Judge Thomas.
Although some swing Democrats were concerned about how female staff or
family members would react to the vote, many more were concerned with how
their black constituents would respond. This was especially true in the South.
For example, the Charlotte Observer noted the following:
While some female leaders were expressing disappointment with Hollings (D-SC) for his
pro-Thomas stance, he was receiving support from another important political group—the
state’s elected black officials. Many were warm in their praise of the senator for sticking by
the nominee. “It was the right thing to do,” said state Sen. Herbert Fielding, D-Charleston,
chairman of the Legislative Black Caucus. Feminists who opposed Thomas’s nomination said
they were not a potent political force in South Carolina to compete with black constituents
for Holling’s support.4
Both journalists and political scientists believed that swing Democrats with
large African American constituencies provided Thomas with his margin of vic-
tory (Overby et al. 1992). In fact, some journalists argued that the Bush admin-
istration shrewdly used black support for Thomas to pressure these ambivalent
2Berke, Richard L. “Senators Who Switched Tell of Political Torment.” New York Times, Wednes-
day, October 16, 1991. The 13 swing Democrats were Senators Boren (OK), Breaux (LA), Bryan
(NV), Dixon (IL), Exon (NE), Fowler (GA), Hollings (SC), Johnston (LA), Lieberman (CT), Nunn
(GA), Reid (NV), Robb (VA), and Shelby (AL).
3 Ibid.
4 Bandy, Lee. “Hollings: ‘Bottom Line’ Is President’s Right To Pick.” Charlotte Observer Octo-
ber 16, 1991. The Memphis Commercial Appeal also reported that “A number of Southern Demo-
crats are up for election next year after narrow victories in 1986 and they noted privately that black
voters in their states backed Judge Thomas.” Rowley, James. “Senate Confirms Thomas, 52-48, To
High Court: After Bitter Debate Judge Gets Key Votes of Southern Dems.” Memphis Commercial
Appeal. Wednesday, October 16, 1991.
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Democrats. The New Orleans Times Picayune described the political situation
in the South as follows:
In charging racism, Thomas appeared to gain support from black viewers–an important con-
sideration for many of the swing Democratic senators because their states have large black
populations. President Bush sought to put further pressure on the wavering Democrats [the
day before the vote] by publicly thanking blacks for siding with Thomas.5
In the end, only three of the thirteen swing Democrats—Senators Bryan (D-NV),
Lieberman (D-CT) and Reid (D-NV)—voted against the nomination. None of
the swing Democrats from the South switched his vote. Thomas was confirmed
on October 15, 1991, with a 52–48 vote, the lowest margin of victory of any
successful nominee in the 20th century.
Data and Measures
The data for my analyses were drawn from the 1992 portion of the Senate
Election Study (SES). This survey is useful for two reasons. First, the SES was
designed to draw a random sample of roughly 60 respondents from each of the
50 states. Thus, comparisons can be made across states in a way that has rarely
been possible before. Secondly, respondents were asked several questions about
the Hill-Thomas hearings including how their senators voted. Those who said
they knew and those who were prepared to guess are treated the same in this
study.
The main dependent variable in this study is the respondent’s ability to recall
accurately how their senators voted on the confirmation of Clarence Thomas to
the US Supreme Court. When results from the full sample are analyzed, this
variable has three possible values: 0, 0.5, 1.0. Respondents coded as “1” accu-
rately identified each senator’s vote, whereas a score of “0.5” represents accu-
rate knowledge of only one senator’s vote, and “0” represents incorrect responses
for both senators or an inability to provide an answer. Some additional analysis
were also done on the Persian Gulf War vote and the standard political infor-
mation scale (also coded 0–1).6 The point of including these variables was to
provide a baseline for comparison with the Thomas model.
As indicated above, expectations of selective attentiveness were located at
both the individual level and the environmental or contextual level. The rele-
vant individual level variables are race (black or white respondents only), gen-
der, and ideology. Ideology was measured in two ways. First and most broadly,
ideology was measured with the standard 7–point ideological scale. I recoded
this scale so that higher values represented a more liberal political orientation.
5 Green, Charles and R. A. Zaldivar. “Public Support May Have Been What Put Thomas Over the
Top.” New Orleans Time Picayune October 16, 1991.
6 The SES asked respondents to identify the political office of several individuals as means of
gauging political knowledge. These individuals were William Rehnquist, Dan Quayle, Tom Foley,
and Al Gore.
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The second measure of ideology was a respondent’s position on the abortion
question. This variable ranges from 1–3 with higher values indicating more
support for abortion rights.
The contextual or environmental measures of selective attentiveness are the
presence of a reelection campaign in the state, the relative competitiveness of
this campaign, the presence of female candidates in the reelection campaign,7
and residence in a state represented by a swing Democrat. Competitiveness
was measured with Congressional Quarterly’s assessment of the incumbent’s
electoral prospects and ranges from 0–4, with higher values indicating greater
competitiveness. Open seat contests were not included in any of the contextual
variables.
Given my expectation that some group members should be more informed of
their senator’s vote than others should, I have also included a number of inter-
action terms. These included interactions for race by residence in a state with a
swing Democrat, gender by ideology, and gender by abortion attitude. The fol-
lowing models also included a number of standard control variables. These vari-
ables are the respondent’s education, age, length of residence in the state, reported
media usage, level of interest in campaigns, support or opposition to the Tho-
mas nomination, and partisan and ideological strength. The level of general
political information, described above as one of the dependent variables, also
doubled as one of the control variables in the Thomas and Gulf War models.
Separate analysis by gender showed that the information and ideological strength
variables performed differently for men and women. For this reason, these vari-
ables were interacted with gender in the analysis presented below.
Results
Table 1 reports mean levels of knowledge on the confirmation vote by gen-
der, race, and ideology. Results are also presented for overall levels of political
information and knowledge of the Gulf War vote, for comparison purposes. Is
there evidence of selective attentiveness? Overall, the results in Table 1 are
mixed. For example, the data in Table 1 show that no clear pattern emerges for
liberal women. They are more knowledgeable than their conservative counter-
parts across all three measures. Also, as expected, there is no significant differ-
ence between liberal men and liberal women on the Thomas vote. However,
there are also no significant differences on the other measures of political
knowledge.
Results for conservative men are also inconclusive. On the one hand, I found
that there were no significant differences between conservative and liberal men
7 The states included in this variable are Arizona, California, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Missouri, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. Carol Mosley Braun (D-IL) competed for an open seat
in the general election but is also included because she defeated an incumbent in the primary.
Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) was the only female incumbent facing reelection.
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on the Thomas vote. On the other hand, these two groups also did not differ on
the Gulf War vote and the political information scale. Also, overall accuracy
rates were lower on the Thomas vote than the Gulf War vote, and differences
between conservative men and women were somewhat higher for the Gulf War
vote.
TABLE 1
Mean Political Information Levels and Knowledge
of Senator’s Vote on the Confirmation of Clarence
Thomas to the US Supreme Court







Women .43 .51 .42
(1374) (1402) (1427)
Men .48a .65a .51a
(1149) (1162) (1181)
Blacks .35 .49 .43
(196) (203) (204)
Women .32 .43 .41
(115) (119) (119)
Men .39b .57b .46
(81) (84) (85)
Whites .46a .58a .46
(2397) (2361) (2404)
Women .44c .51c .42
(1259) (1283) (1308)
Men .48b,c .66b,c .52b
(1068) (1078) (1096)
Ideology
Liberal Women .51 .63 .53
(267) (278) (285)
Liberal Men .52 .67 .53
(218) (229) (232)
Conservative Women .44c .55c .44c
(450) (458) (465)
Conservative Men .50a .70a .58a
(461) (460) (470)
All Cases .45 .57 .46
Note: Number of cases in parentheses. a Significant difference across gen-
der or race at p # .05; b Significant differences across gender within racial
groups at p # .05; c Significant difference across race or ideology within
gender group at p # .05.
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The data in Table 1 are less ambiguous with regard to African Americans.
Although blacks were significantly less likely than whites to be informed about
general political matters and their senator’s vote on the Gulf War initiative, the
difference on the Thomas vote were mild and statistically insignificant. These
results suggest that the racial gap in political knowledge declines significantly
on issues salient to blacks.
Uncovering evidence of individual differences in knowledge levels on the
Thomas vote is important, but it only represents half of my argument. I also
expect differences based on the political and informational environment of
the respondent. These results are shown in Table 2. The first two columns
report effects for the presence of female Senate candidates. I expect that
female candidates were more likely to draw attention to the incumbent’s vote
on the Thomas nomination and thus respondents should be more informed
in these states. However, because there was no theoretical reason why this
variable should affect information about the senator whose term was not up,
TABLE 2
Mean Knowledge of Senator’s Vote on Confirmation
of Clarence Thomas to the US Supreme Court by


























































All Cases .40 .58 .46 .46
Note: Results for first two columns apply only for senators up for reelection. *Significant across
contexts at p # .05. a Significant difference across gender or race at p # .05; b Significant differ-
ences across gender within racial groups at p # .05; c Significant difference across race or ideol-
ogy within gender group at p # .05. One-tailed test.
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the results in the first two columns of Table 2 apply only to senators facing
reelection.
In general, I find strong environmental effects. When a female candidate
was on the ballot, accuracy rates were, on average, 18 percentage points higher
than in other states. Nonetheless, contrary to expectations, the effects of this
variable are not necessarily greater for the issue publics examined in this arti-
cle. For example, the effects of the female candidate variable are smaller for
women generally, and for liberal women especially. Additionally, there are no
differences between liberal and conservative men.
The last set of columns in Table 2 show results for living in a state repre-
sented by a Swing Democrat. These results provide additional qualified support
for my hypothesis. Contrary to expectations, residing in one of these states
makes no significant difference for most of the groups. Moreover, conservative
men were slightly less attentive in these states. African Americans represent the
one exception to this trend. Accuracy rates increase by 14% ( p # .01) for
blacks living in the mostly southern states represented by Swing Democrats.
Moreover, only in these states do traditional racial differences in information
levels reverse themselves ( p # .11 for a one-tailed test).
The bi-variate comparisons in Tables 1 and 2 yield only mixed support for
the issue salience and context hypotheses. Still, it is possible that stronger re-
sults will emerge from a multi-variate framework. These results are reported in
Table 3. The first pair of columns present the ordered logit regression coeffi-
cients and standard errors for analysis of the political knowledge scale.8 Analy-
sis of the Gulf War vote is shown in the two middle columns and the Thomas
vote is analyzed in the final two columns.
As proponents of the “generalist” argument would expect, levels of general
political information were also highly associated with levels of specific politi-
cal information. For example, the coefficient of 1.47 in the Thomas model in-
dicates that the most highly informed male respondent (i.e., “1” on the political
information scale) has a .78 probability of accurately identifying the vote of at
least one of his senators. The probability is .45 for the least informed male
respondent, all else equal. The effects were considerably weaker for women.
The most politically informed woman has a .62 probability of identifying the
vote of one of her senators while the probability is only .46 for the least informed.
The effects of the political environment variables are generally consistent
with my expectations.9 For example, the coefficient of .65 on the female can-
8 Ordered logistic regression is used because the dependent variables are categorical.
9 One exception is the negative sign on the election variable in the Thomas model. This indicates
that respondents were somewhat less informed about the vote of their senator if he or she was up
for reelection in 1992 (see Alvarez and Gronke 1996, for similar results). The variable measuring
the competitiveness of the election has the opposite sign, however, suggesting that the negative
effects of elections apply primarily to senators facing weak challengers. Apparently, these senators
have an incentive to obfuscate their position on controversial issues (Page 1978). Incumbents with
strong challengers, however, cannot adopt this strategy as easily.
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TABLE 3
Ordered Logit Regression Models Predicting Levels of Political
Information, Knowledge of Senator’s Vote on the Gulf War
Use of Force Resolution, and the Confirmation of
Clarence Thomas to the US Supreme Court
Political
Information Gulf War Thomas
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES Logit Std. Error Logit Std. Error Logit Std. Error
Political Information (0–1) — 1.34*** (.27) 1.47*** (.27)
Media Usea (0–7) .05** (.02) .06*** (.02) .04* (.02)
Education (1–5) .26*** (.03) .13*** (.03) .12*** (.03)
Party Strengthb (0–3) .05 (.04) .15*** (.04) .10** (.04)
Campaign Interest (1–3) .51*** (.07) .22*** (.07) .10 (.07)
Age (17–97) .01*** (.00) 2.01*** (.00) 2.01*** (.00)
Years in State (0–89) 2.01** (.00) .01*** (.00) .01*** (.00)
Abortion Attitudes (1–3) .20* (.10) .05 (.10) .00 (.10)
Thomas0Warc (0–1) .77*** (.11) .61*** (.11) .93*** (.12)
Ideology (1–7) 2.00 (.05) 2.05 (.05) 2.08* (.05)
Ideological Strengthb (0–3) .16** (.06) 2.01 (.06) .05 (.06)
Female (0–1) 2.90*** (.36) 21.07* (.38) 21.04** (.38)
Black (0–1) 2.73*** (.20) 2.31 (.20) 2.12 (.20)
Swing Democrat (0–1) .07 (.12) .17 (.12) .07 (.12)
Female Candidate (0–1) .04 (.12) .01 (.13) .65*** (.12)
Election in State (0–1) 2.29* (.16) 2.04 (.16) 2.50*** (.16)
Competitive Election (0–4) .14** (.06) 2.02 (.06) .12* (.05)
Interaction variables
Black * Swing Democrat (0–1) 2.18 (.32) .36 (.31) .69** (.31)
Female * Ideology (0–7) .08 (.07) .08 (.07) .15** (.07)
Female * Ideo. Strength (0–3) 2.04 (.08) .22** (.08) .14* (.08)
Female * Abortion Attitude (0–3) .11 (.13) .16 (.13) .16 (.13)
Female * Information (0–1) — 2.91** (.37) 2.80* (.37)
Log likelihood 22792.50 22319.79 22401.81
Chi Square 491.86 343.76 342.84
Number of Cases 2354 2311 2354
Note: *p # .05; **p # .01; ***p # .001 for One-tailed test, except constant. a This variable is a
combination of two questions measuring how many days in the past week that the respondent
watched news programs on TV or read a daily newspaper. The variables were combined and di-
vided by two. b These variables measure the strength of the respondent’s partisan or ideological
attachment. Higher values indicate a stronger attachment to either the Republican or Democratic
party, or conservative or liberal ideology. c Respondents who took no position on the Gulf War vote
or the Thomas vote were coded as “0,” and respondents who either supported or opposed the action
were coded as “1.” In the Gulf War model, only the Gulf War attitude question was included
whereas in the Thomas and Information models, only the Thomas attitude question was included.
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didate variable indicates that, all else equal, respondents in these states have a
.69 probability of accurately identifying the vote of at least one of their sena-
tors. For respondents in other states the probability is only .54. The presence of
female Senate candidates had no significant effect on levels of political infor-
mation or attentiveness to the Gulf War vote.10
Table 3 also reveals evidence of selective attentiveness among conservative
men but only mixed results for liberal women. For example, the ideology coef-
ficient in the Thomas model is significant and negative, indicating that conser-
vative men were more accurate than were liberal men. The ordered logit model
predicts that a conservative man has a .71 probability of identifying how at
least one of his senators voted on the Thomas nomination. The equivalent prob-
ability for a liberal man is only .59. In the other two models, differences be-
tween these groups were either insignificant or favor liberal men. The effects
of ideology are different for women in the Thomas model, as shown by the
positive interaction term. This indicates that liberal women have a .68 probabil-
ity of identifying the vote of at least one senator, whereas for conservative
women, the probability is only .58. Still, differences between liberal women
and liberal men are not statistically significant.11
The multivariate analysis also reveals racial differences in information levels
on the Thomas confirmation vote. Overall, the black-white knowledge gap, still
evident for the political information and the Gulf War models, diminishes to
almost zero on the Thomas vote. More importantly, however, residence in a
state with a swing Democrat significantly increases accuracy rates for black
respondents. The model predicts that the probability that an African American
in these states will know the position of at least one of their senators is .69,
versus a probability of .51 in all other states. For whites the probabilities are
.55 and .54, respectively.
10 An alternative interpretation is that female candidates were more likely to run in states where
citizens were already aware of and angry about their incumbent’s vote. Although this seems to be a
plausible hypothesis, the explanation fails both logically and empirically. Of the eight challengers
included in this variable, only two—Yeakel (PA) and Mosley-Braun (IL)—seem to fit the descrip-
tion. The argument is more of a stretch for the remaining challengers. For example, Dianne Fein-
stein (CA) declared her intentions to run for the Senate before the Thomas controversy, and Charlene
Haar (SD) challenged a Democratic opponent of Thomas. There was no expectation that the other
incumbents would oppose Thomas and thus little grounds for anger. Still, if the alternative expla-
nation is true, then the “female candidate” coefficient should decrease with the exclusion of Penn-
sylvania and Illinois. Also, attitudes toward Thomas should be more extreme in states with female
candidates. Neither assumption is supported.
11 When assessing the significance of an interaction, Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1990) suggest
examining how the slope on the interaction term varies as the values of the main effects change. In
other words, they recommend that a coefficient and standard error be calculated for every possible
value of the interaction. Using the formula they provide, I find that liberal women are more accu-
rate than liberal men, but the difference is not significant.
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Issue Salience, the Political Environment
and the 1992 Senate Elections
Table 3 showed that issue salience and factors in the political environment
can work both separately and interactively to increase political information
levels. It seems likely, however, that the context effects will be greater for
senators whose term of office was up in 1992. Recall that six of the 13 swing
Democrats were up for reelection, and this contributed to their anxiety over
the Thomas vote. Similarly, the female candidate variable should also be most
strongly associated with attentiveness to senators facing reelection. An ideal
way to test this proposition is to compare the effects of the environmental
variables on senators up for reelection to the effects for senators in those same
states who were not on the ballot. In other words, respondents in states with
female Senate candidates or with swing Democrats on the ballot should have
been more informed of their incumbent’s vote than they were about senators
who were not up for reelection. Moreover, these environmental cues should
have been especially pronounced for those respondents most engaged by the
political campaign—the voters. For this reason, the analysis of information
levels for senators facing reelection in 1992 only included respondents who
voted in the Senate elections.
Table 4 presents the logistic regression coefficients for senators facing re-
election in 1992 and for senators in those same states who were not on the
ballot. As in Table 3, the models controlled for a variety of demographic and
attitudinal factors. A number of important findings emerge from this table. First,
I find that blacks in states with swing Democrats on the ballot were signifi-
cantly more likely than their white counterparts to identify accurately their sena-
tor’s vote on the Thomas nomination. This variable falls well short of statistical
significance for senators in these same states who were not up for reelection.
Secondly, the effects of female Senate candidates are significantly positive for
senators facing reelection but indistinguishable from zero for senators not on
the ballot. Finally, the abortion-by-gender interaction, that did not achieve sig-
nificance in Table 3, is significant in Table 4, but only for senators facing
reelection.
In order to appreciate the size of these effects, the coefficients were con-
verted into predicted probabilities, as shown in Table 5. As expected, the ef-
fects of the contextual variables are much larger for senators facing reelection
than for senators not facing reelection. For example, voters in states with fe-
male candidates were .29 points more likely to identify accurately the vote of
the incumbent than were voters in states without female candidates. The effect
of this variable for senators not up for reelection is almost zero. Similarly, black
voters were approximately .29 points more likely than whites to identify the
vote of swing Democrats. However, blacks are only .08 points more accurate
than whites for the senators not up for reelection in these same states.
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Selective Attentiveness and Political Support
I showed in the previous section that issue salience, the appropriate political
environment, and (in at least one case) their interaction can increase attentive-
ness to political issues. What we do not know is what role these variables played
in the 1992 Senate elections. The answer to this question is important because
it has implications for the ability of the voter to carry out his or her democratic
obligations. In other words, if the political context and perceptions of issue
importance can affect information levels, but not voting behavior, then the abil-
TABLE 4
Logistic Regression Models Predicting Knowledge of Senator’s Vote
on the Confirmation of Clarence Thomas to the U+S+ Supreme Court
Not Facing Reelection Facing Reelection
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Logit Std. Error Logit Std. Error
Intercept 2.991 (.71) 21.70** (.73)
Political Information 2.01*** (.54) 2.16*** (.56)
Media Use 2.01 (.04) .01 (.04)
Education .12* (.06) .12* (.06)
Party Strength .03 (.08) .13* (.08)
Campaign Interest .02 (.13) 2.15 (.14)
Age 2.00 (.00) 2.011 (.01)
Years in State 2.00 (.00) .01* (.00)
Abortion Attitudes 2.33* (.18) .02 (.19)
Supported or Opposed Thomas 1.08*** (.23) .84*** (.23)
Ideology 2.08 (.09) 2.15* (.09)
Ideological Strength 2.04 (.12) 2.06 (.13)
Female 21.53* (.73) 21.63** (.75)
Black .05 (.33) 2.06 (.34)
Swing Democrat 2.07 (.20) 2.14 (.21)
Female Candidate .10 (.16) 1.18*** (.17)
Competitive Election .01 (.08) .19** (.08)
Interaction variables
Black* Swing Democrat .26 (.53) 1.27** (.56)
Female* Ideology .24* (.12) .171 (.12)
Female* Ideological Strength .19 (.16) .04 (.16)
Female* Abortion Attitude .25 (.24) .50* (.25)
Female* Information 21.23* (.73) 21.33* (.75)
% Predicted Correctly 60.74 65.24
Chi. Square 95.59 149.37
22 Log Likelihood 1136.57 1082.60
N 889 889
Note: Table includes results for Senate election voters only. 1p # .10; *p # .05; **p # .01;
***p # .001 for One-tailed test, except for constant.
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ity of these variables to strengthen the influence of the voter is considerably
limited.
Other researchers have examined the impact of the Thomas vote on the 1992
Senate elections (Wolpert and Gimpel 1997). Their results are remarkably weak.
For example, Wolpert and Gimpel found almost no evidence that groups with
particular interest in the Thomas vote (i.e., blacks, women, and ideologues)
were more likely to vote for or against their senator on the basis of this roll call
(1997). Accurate knowledge of the Thomas vote only aided the vote choice of
respondents with opinions on the Thomas nomination and (in the case of Sen-
ate supporters of Thomas) pro-choice voters.
The conclusion that interest in the Thomas vote had no significant impact on
the 1992 Senate elections might be premature. Congressional scholars have
long noted that members of Congress are rarely concerned about the electoral
consequences of any one vote (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1973). When a vote does
raise a problem, it is typically when legislators vote against the wishes of a
significant number of their constituents (Miller and Stokes 1963). Thus, it is
unlikely that many citizens would vote to reward the behavior of their senators
on the Thomas vote. It is far more likely that they would seek to punish way-
TABLE 5
Predicted Accuracy Rates for the Thomas Confirmation
Vote Among Various Sub-groups in States
with Reelection Campaigns
(Voters Only)








Pro-Choice, Liberal Women .66 .51
Pro-Choice, Liberal Men .45 .38
Pro-Life, Conservative Women .46 .24
Pro-Life, Conservative Men .72 .59
Political Environment
Electoral Competition: High .50 .46
Electoral Competition: Low .49 .33
Female Candidate .52 .66
No Female Candidate .49 .37
Blacks in Swing States .55 .63
Whites in Swing States .47 .34
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ward senators. Moreover, voters are also more likely to rely upon a single vote
when they are on the losing side of an issue (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1996). In
other words, citizens are more likely to use a single roll call as a basis for
voting when they have incurred some political cost.
All of the above research suggests that the group most likely to have used
the Thomas vote as a guide to their vote decision would be liberal women. The
other two groups focused upon in this article, blacks and conservative men,
were on the winning side of the Thomas vote and so presumably should not
have relied heavily on this vote when casting their ballots. Moreover, in those
states where blacks and conservative men were most concentrated (i.e., the south),
senators of both parties largely supported the nomination. Only liberal women
would potentially have the motivation and opportunity to punish their senators.
One way they could carry out this punishment is by voting against the sup-
porters of Thomas. The problem with this expectation, however, is that most
supporters of Thomas were Republicans. Liberal women could not plausibly
punish these senators by withdrawing their support because they were not likely
to support them in any case. The senators most likely to be damaged politically
by the opposition of liberal women were the Democratic supporters of Thomas.
Still, it is unlikely that liberal women would vote for the Republican challeng-
ers of these swing Democrats. A second and more desirable option available to
liberal women who knew how these senators had voted, and disapproved of
their decision, was to not vote at all. Just as perceived policy responsiveness
may encourage participation among some citizens, the lack of responsiveness
may also discourage participation (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). Fenno provides
some support for this hypothesis. In his 1996 book, Senators on the Campaign
Trail, he notes that Senator Fowler (D-GA), one of the swing Democrats up for
reelection in 1992, encountered some trouble from this constituency because of
this vote (Fenno 1996).12
One way to test this hypothesis is to examine turnout rates among liberal
women especially in states represented by swing Democrats. Table 6 presents
the results of a logistic regression analysis of voter turnout, controlling for all
the traditional demographic and attitudinal variables. The data have been di-
vided into states with senators opposing the Thomas nomination and states with
senators who supported the nomination. The data are further divided among
men and women with the expectation that only liberal women would make the
strategic decision to avoid voting rather than to support pro-Thomas Democrats.
The relevant variable in each of the four models is the triple interaction cap-
turing turnout rates for liberal respondents who knew how their Democratic
senator voted on the Thomas nomination. If liberal women were interested in
12 “[Fowler’s] single most harmful failure to keep in touch involved his inattentiveness to a core
element of his 1986 coalition—the strongly supportive liberal, pro-choice women who had become
disaffected in the wake of his vote in support of conservative, anti-abortion Clarence Thomas for
the Supreme Court” (Fenno 1996, p. 194).
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TABLE 6
Logistic Regression Models Predicting Voter Turnout by Gender
and Senator’s Support for Thomas Nomination
Senator Opposed Thomas Senator Supported Thomas
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Men Women Men Women
Intercept 24.19 25.67** 29.62*** 24.24***
(3.20) (2.68) (1.73) (1.15)
Political Information 1.46** .56 2.14*** 1.79***
(.88) (1.07) (.81) (.70)
Media Use .05 .17** .17** .07
(.10) (.09) (.09) (.08)
Education .32** .37*** .09 .11
(.05) (.15) (.14) (.11)
Family Income .08 .31** .54*** .18**
(.15) (.15) (.14) (.11)
Strength of Partisanship 2.05 .48*** .38** .34***
(.17) (.19) (.18) (.14)
Interest in Campaigns .86*** 1.28*** 1.14*** .63***
(.25) (.30) (.29) (.22)
Age .03*** .03*** .03*** .02***
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Ideology 2.04 2.40 .57** .00
(.80) (.49) (.31) (.20)
Black 1.27** 2.45 2.77* .38
(.62) (.65) (.56) (.46)
Democratic Senator 2.46 21.91 .85 2.24
(3.18) (2.41) (1.61) (1.24)
Competitive Election .17 2.12 .03 .03
(.24) (.24) (.19) (.14)
Thomas Knowledge .13 6.55 3.02*** 2.86
(80.2) (108.7) (1.37) (1.09)
Dem. * Thomas Knowledge .22 25.69 22.51 2.62*
(.53) (108.7) (2.66) (1.95)
Democrat * Ideology 2.09 .42 2.57* 2.14
(.82) (.52) (.41) (.33)
Ideo. * Thomas Knowledge 22.86 .08 2.78*** .28
(31.5) (28.3) (.36) (.28)
Dem.* Thomas* Ideology 2.63 2.07 .80 2.74*
(31.5) (28.3) (.70) (.50)
22 Log Likelihood 208.726 206.347 223.487 342.042
Chi Square 65.265*** 103.678*** 113.962*** 79.041***
N 209 262 264 341
Note: *p # .10; **p # .05; ***p # .01 for One-tailed test, except for the constant.
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punishing Democratic supporters of Thomas by not voting then the triple inter-
action should be negative and statistically significant in the final column of
Table 6. This expectation is confirmed ( p # .07). Interestingly, these women
were also less likely to vote in the presidential election (results not shown).
This suggests that political disaffection among this group did not derive en-
tirely from the Thomas vote. Perhaps candidate Clinton’s decision to run as a
“new Democrat” also undermined liberal women’s political enthusiasm. Still,
whatever range of factors may have contributed to their decision, it is clear that
the Thomas vote had a significant influence.
In order to get a sense of the magnitude of this effect the coefficients are
converted into predicted probabilities, as reported in Table 7. Only results for
strong conservative and strong liberal women (i.e., “1” and “7” on the ideolog-
ical scale) are reported.13 We see in the final column of Table 7 that liberal
women with accurate knowledge of the Thomas vote had an especially low
probability of voting in states represented by Democratic supporters of the nom-
ination. This represents a marked contrast to the participation rates of informed
13 These probabilities should be interpreted with some caution. As one might expect, given the
relatively small state samples in the SES, the predicted probabilities are based on very few cases.
For example, there were only 12 self-described liberal women in states represented by Democratic
supporters of Thomas, and only two were strong liberals. Still, the raw percentages tell a similar
story. The percentage of liberal women (weak and strong) in these states who actually reported
voting is 50% compared to 88% of liberal women in other states and 86% of conservative women
in states represented by swing Democrats. Both sets of comparisons are statistically significant at
the .05 level.
TABLE 7
Predicted Turnout Rates in Senate Election for Strong Liberal and













Did Not Know How Senator Voted
Strong Liberal Women .44 .76 .68 .49
Strong Conservative Women .89 .76 .66 .68
Did Know How Senator Voted
Strong Liberal Women .99 .91 .85 .19
Strong Conservative Women .99 .64 .82 .89
Note: “Opposed” refers to senators voting against the Thomas nomination and “Supported” re-
fers to Senators supporting the nomination. Predicted values based on strong liberals (i.e., ideology
equals “7”) and strong conservatives (i.e., ideology equals “1”), with all other variables held to
their mean or median.
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conservative women, within these same states.14 At a minimum, these results
suggest that these liberal women remembered their senator’s vote on the con-
troversial nomination and decided to send a message by staying home.
Conclusion
The principal question this study sought to answer was whether perceptions
of issue salience and external political factors increase levels of political infor-
mation. The results indicate that these factors are important both separately and
interactively. For example conservative men, and to a lesser extent liberal women,
were significantly more knowledgeable of their senator’s vote on the Thomas
nomination than were relevant comparison groups. I also showed that these
respondents were generally not more knowledgeable about politics when their
group interests were not primed. Moreover, factors in the political environ-
ment, such as the presence of female Senate candidates, also increased accu-
racy rates. On matters where the gender of the candidates was less important
(i.e., the Gulf War vote and the political information scale), this variable had
no effect.
The interaction of salience and political context also affected accuracy rates,
although not always in the manner hypothesized. I expected that group mem-
bers with special interests in the Thomas vote would be even more accurate in
states represented by swing Democrats. This turned out to be true, however,
only for African Americans. Still, these effects were considerable, especially
for senators facing reelection. For these senators, blacks not only closed the
traditional racial gap in political information, but they also surpassed compara-
ble whites.
Finally, the interaction of salience and political context also influenced par-
ticipation rates. Although the evidence among liberal women for heightened
attentiveness to the Thomas vote was mixed, those who did know how their
senator voted responded differently than comparable groups. Liberal women
with accurate knowledge of the Thomas vote were significantly less likely to
participate in their local Senate elections in states where the incumbent Demo-
crat supported Thomas. Participation rates among others were unaffected by
knowledge of this vote.
Why has other research in this area uncovered less powerful and consistent
evidence of selective attentiveness? Undoubtedly, part of the answer is that re-
searchers have not always looked in the right places. While using group mem-
bership as a proxy for issue salience is appropriate, researchers need to recognize
14 Using the formula referred to in note 11 confirms that turnout was significantly different
between informed liberals and informed conservatives (t-ratio 5 21.82). This same formula also
shows that informed liberal women represented by Democratic senators were significantly more
likely to vote if their senator opposed Thomas (t-ratio 5 2.22). However, informed liberals did not
have significantly different turnout rates relative to uninformed liberals in states represented by
Democratic supporters of Thomas (t-ratio 5 21.02).
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the importance of overlapping group memberships. Sometimes, these different
memberships can cancel out any anticipated effects. Failure to take this com-
plication into account can lead to an underestimation of salience effects. For
example, researchers operating under the assumption that most conservatives
were concerned about the outcome of the Thomas vote would have found little
evidence of selective attentiveness.
Another reason why some previous work has found limited support for the
issue salience hypothesis is that insufficient attention has been paid to the po-
litical context. As the results of this study demonstrate, salience effects can at
times be enhanced by factors in the local political environment. Bobo and Gil-
liam (1990) have already shown that this can occur with changes in control of
the mayor’s office. This study shows that more subtle differences in the politi-
cal environment can also increase information levels.
With regard to the debate between the generalist and the specialist models of
political information processing, this article provides only a limited resolution.
Both models account for some of the variation in respondents’ knowledge of
their senators’ vote on the Thomas nomination. The generalist model, however,
works much better for men than for women. Among men, the effects of the
general measure of political knowledge are usually about twice the size of the
salience measures. Among women, the effects are more comparable.
Overall, the democratic implications of these findings are somewhat reassur-
ing. This is because they suggest that, although the electorate may be generally
uninformed on political matters, citizens concerned with particular issues are
unusually attentive to their representative’s position on those issues. Still, this
interpretation should not be carried too far. The results of this study only apply
to one highly publicized roll call. Whether or not similar results would emerge
for less prominent votes awaits future research.
Finally, identifying how much various groups knew about the position of
their senators on the Thomas nomination helps to explain why Thomas suc-
ceeded in spite of the controversy sparked by his hearings. This study confirms
that senators were right to be concerned with how their constituents might re-
act. The constituents whom senators feared would be especially attentive were
indeed more informed than others. In the end, Thomas was successful because
the issue publics most concerned with the vote were also not randomly distrib-
uted across the nation. The two groups most predisposed to support Thomas—
blacks and conservative men—represented a potent, although unusual coalition.
They were also disproportionately concentrated in the states represented by swing
Democrats.
The successful confirmation vote of Clarence Thomas to the U.S. Supreme
Court was broadly responsive in the sense that most voters favored the nomi-
nation. The Senate vote was more narrowly responsive as well, however, be-
cause many senators paid special attention to the concerns of voters with the
most intense opinions on this issue. In spite of the consistent finding that infor-
mation levels are typically low, legislators likely feared that if they voted “in-
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correctly” interested voters would learn of this and exact retribution at the ballot
box. At a minimum, the results in this article suggest that this concern was a
reasonable one.
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